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SECTION i
SUMMARY
Design Engineering, with the support of Launch Operations and Technical Support, has
conducted a comprehensive study of potential propellant and gas release hazards at all
the active KSC facilities under Design Engineering responsibility. The findings indicate
that:
a. There are some relatively minor problems that can be readily corrected.
b. There are several GOX cloud problems requiring management decisions on the
technical alternatives in relation to the degree of risks involved.
c. A few problems require further detai led study.
The requirement for dumping relatively large amounts of LOX at LC-39 is the most
serious problem, with a choice between an effective but expensive catch tank method
for controlled venting and something less elaborate depending upon acceptance of
higher risk factors. Relatively large quantities of LH2 or GH2 are considered disposable
by vaporizing and controlled burning, whi Ie smaller amounts of GH2 vented to the atmo-
sphere are seen as acceptable risks.
The study indicates that large quantities of LN2 may be dumped in remote open areas,
and that large quantities of GN2and moderate amounts of RP-1, GN2' GOX, and GHe
usually can be safely vented with suitable personnel controls plus provisions for dilution
and monitoring to ensure that safe oxygen levels are maintained. Where there is a possi-
biity of high concentrations of propellant vapors developing, it is recommended that
electrical equipment be hazard proofed or turned off as verified by inspection tests.
Among the detailed studies currently being conducted are:
a. LV tests to determine whether or not tankers at LC-39 can be vented through
the facility drain.
b. DE evaluation of methods for decomposition of hypergol vapors.
c. ULO comparisons of the alternatives for disposing of LOX and GOX at LC-17,
and a study of possible extension of LC-36 vent lines.
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SECTION II
INTRODUCTION
2.1 PURPOSE
This study was initiated by Design Engineering in cooperation with Launch Operations
and Technical Support, at the request of the Apollo Program Manager, acting upon
recommendations of the Board of Investigation for the Motor Vehicle Fire at LC-39,
March 25, 1970. The primary purpose of the study was to identify problem areas and
develop methods for the reduction or elimination of potential hazards to personnel or
equipment exposed to persistent gas vapors generated by discharging large quantities of
propellants, gases, or cryogenic liquids to the atmosphere.
It was also required that any of the alternative methods developed be based on retention
of the existing basic system design and functional requirements.
2.2 SCOPE
All currently active KSC launch support facilities equipped with propellant or hazardous
gas systems have been reviewed with respect to normal systems operation, maintenance,
standby, and normal modes of fai lure such as leakage or an inadvertent operation that
could normally be expected like activation of a safety relief valve. Abnonnal or catas-
trophic failures have not been considered. The effect of environmental pollution as a
result of propellant-and gas discharges has not been considered except as specifically
noted.
2.3 CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVES
Criteria selected for the evaluation of the alternative methods developed for reducing or
eliminating the potential hazards described above. include the following (in the order of
relative importance):
a. System Operation: System design and functional requirements must be retained
(back pressure, flow and temperature requirements).
b. Safety: Maximize safety, minimize probabi lity of occurrence of hazardous con-
ditions.
c. Cost: Alternative should be cost effective.
d. Schedule: Planning schedules should not be jeopardized.
e. Other KSC Resources: To include impact of implementation and operation, and
maintenance.
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2.4 STUDY PROCEDURE
For each area of concern the responsible design and operations and maintenance organi-
zation identified the quantities of materials vented or discharged in the system opera-
tional modes, and analyzed alternative methods in relation to the five criteria established
above. The effectiveness of each alternative in satisfying these criteria was then summed
to determine the overall ranking for each of the following operational modes:
a. System charging, i.e., filling storage vessels, etc.
b. System standby.
c. System operation, including functional tests, countdown demonstration test and
launch operations.
d. Post-test operations, including returning system to normal standby mode.
From this data, recommendations were made as to the best alternatives, including sup-
porting rationale as appropriate. Results are presented on an area-by-area outline in
Section III. .
2-2
SECTION III
SYSTEMS INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS
All active KSC launch support fad Iities under Design Engineering responsibi lity have been
reviewed to detennine the nature and extent of potential hazards from propellant and gas
releases to the environment. The results of this review, alternative methods for reducing
or eliminating the hazards, and recommendations pertaining to these alternatives are pre-
sented for the respective KSC areas: LC-39 , Spacecraft and Industrial Area, and
Unmanned launch Operations.
3.1 LAUNCH COMPLEX 39
3.1.1 PADS A AND B
3.1.1.1 LOX System
A. Sbstem Charging. During this mode of operation, the only hazard is the
venting of G Xto the atmosphere at the tanker valve station, from 50 psi down to 5 psi,
after the tankers have been off loaded to the storage tank. The alternative solutions to
this problem, ranked in relation to the criteria, are as follows:
1. Vent tankers through faci lity drain system.
2. Provide separate venting system for tankers.
3. Continue present procedure (with modifications to reduce hazards).
4. Change venting procedure to vent one tanker "at a time.
5. Partial vent at pad, complete venting at a remote location.
The first alternative method of reducing the hazard by venting tankers through the faci lity
drain system is feasible; however, it uses a pump bypass line that may cause extended
venting times, which would adversely affect the LOX System capabi lity to meet the
23-hour turn-around requirement following a launch scrub after cryogenic loading. LV
Is presently scheduling tests to determine the venting rates for the tankers (Linde and
Big Three) when venting through the bypass and faci lity vent line. If tests show that
venting in this manner will not impact the 23-hour turn-around, this alternative would
be preferred because of nominal cost, schedule, and other resources impact.
A separate venting system for the tankers is feaSible. Such a system would have con-
nections for removing vapors away from the loading area prior to venting them to
the atmosphere. This system has an advantage over using the faci lity drain system in
permitting disposal of vented gases even when tankers are being loaded from the storage
tank. This system would be expensive because of new hardware, procedures, and sub-
stantial design work required for implementation. It would also increase system mainte-
nance cost, but could probably be scheduled without impact on launch activities.
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The third alternative method requires a procedural change to allow partial venting at the
loading area. Whi Ie this procedure would reduce the quantity of GOX released at the
unloading area, it would require a new remote area for final venting that would have to
be controlled. In addition I since the tankers would sti II be under some pressure I a new
hazard would be created along the route between the unloading area and the remote area.
Moving the trai lers to the remote area would also have an adverse effect on turn-around
times. This method of venting would allow sizable quantities of GOX to be vented in the
venting area. It-would not have a signfficantcost, schedule; or other resources impact.
The fourth alternative of venting one tanker at a time would reduce the GOX concentration
in the storage area; however, experience indicates that under certain atmospheric condi-
tions I a large GOX cloud can be produced by venting a single tanker. In addition I the
tankers may be delayed while waiting to_Vel1t and this could keep the system from
meeting the 23-hour turn-around. This method could also have a cost" oi s-chedule
impact.
The last method of venting is undesirable because the present procedure has no specific
precaution to control the GOX cloud. If this method is continued I some means for real
time evaluation of the GOX cloud hazard should be developed, i.e. I monitoring with
oxygen detectors I controlling tanker venting as necessary. Although the procedure pre-
sently used could be modified as mentioned above I it would sti II be only marginally
acceptable. This venting procedure would have little cost impact and no other resources
or schedule impact.
RECOMMENDATION
If scheduled LV tanker venting tests indicate that the
tankers can be satisfactorily vented through the facility
drain system, it is recommended that the first alterna-
tive method be implemented. If the tests indicate that
the system cannot be vented sati sfactori Iy through use
of the faci lity drain system, it is recommended that the
second alternative be implemented. A separate venting
system is more expensive from design and maintenance
standpoints, but its implementation is not likely to
impact launch activities I and this system has the added
advantage of permitting venting during loading. Any
design changes resulting from the scheduled tests will
be initiated through the normal KSC change board pro-
cess.
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B. Standby. During standby periods., the LOX storage sphere is continually
venting boiloff to the atmosphere.
RECOMMENDATION
Gas vented is relatively warm, its flow rate is low, and
the point of discharge is elevated, thus minimizing asso-
ciated hazards; therefore, this mode of operation is con-
sidered acceptable.
C. S~stem Operation. There are three sub-modes of system operation that may
produce clou s of GOX, and the alternative solutions will be discussed for the following
sub-modes: Vent-Dump Basin, Leakage and Relief Valve Operation, and System Chill-
down.
Vent-dump basin. Approximately 20,000 gallons of LOX are pumped into
the LOX Dump Basin prior t<1 5-11 Fast Fi II in order to purge the uninsulated 14-inch
cross country line of "warm II LOX. This dump produces large clouds of GOX, which
can travel considerable distances before dispersing. The alternative solutions to this
problem are:
1. Provide a catch tank to contain dumped liquid and provide means to
disperse vented gas.
2. Provide minor modifications for existing basin.
The first alternative is most satisfactory from a technical standpoint since the catch tank
would permit separation, and the vented gas could be released at a controlled rate and
sufficient elevation for adequate dilution of the GOX vapor. The tank could be of several
different configurations including a pressure vessel with a capacity of up to 50,000
gallons (to allow for several main line dumps due to reverts or other reasons), and would
have an elevated vent stack simi lar to that of the main LOX storage vessel. A detai led
design and testing program would be required to determine the optimum configuration.
This recommendation involves a very extensive hardware change, although tanks, piping,
and other hardware which could probably be adapted to this service may be avai lable in
government surplus. Depending upon the degree of sophistication of the hardware
required to reduce the GOX concentration to an acceptable level, the cost of designing,
developing, and implementing this recommendation could exceed $100,000.
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The second alternative based on minimum change requires the acceptance of more risk
and uncertainty with regard to the concentrations and locations of GOX clouds. This
change involves increasing the area and height of the existing dump basin and providing
an entry diffuser to prevent LOX from splashing out of the basin. This would effectively
contain the LOX and would allow rapid vaporization but probably would not substantially
reduce the size or concentration of the vapor cloud.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that the second alternative be implemented
and that the added ri sk be accepted.
Leakage and relief valve operation. During normal system operation, the poten-
tial exists for Lox/GOX to be discharged into the atmosphere. These discharge areas
include relief valves, packing stem glands, valve bonnet gaskets, piping gaskets, and
various system connections. The hazard appears to be relatively minor and no alternative
approaches are suggested.
RECOMMEN DATION S
The risk arising from this sub-mode of operation appears
acceptable because the quantities of LOX/GOX at the
locations cited are small and results in a minimum hazard.
S~stem chilldown. As a result of "preparations for vehicle loading" and
'actual loading" operations varying quantities of LOX and GOX are dumped. Because of
the differences in the pads, the relationships of existing drain lines from the storage areas
to the ditches outside the perimeter fences require separate solutions of the problems for
each pad; however, the alternatives are basically the same type, as follows:
1. Install catch tank with vent stack to dispose of vented LOX and GOX .
2. Perform site work (minor at Pad A) at existing installation.
3. Pad A: Extend facility drain lines. Pad B: Extend drain piping and
perform site work.
4. Continue venting with existing installation.
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The first alternative would provide a catch tank and vent stack at the end of facility
drain lines, similar in design and function to the installation described for use at the
lC-39 LOX dump basin. The tank could be located either at the end of the existing
drain lines or at some more remote location. This modification would be most effective
in dispersing the GOX cloud because it vents at an elevated location; however, it would
be expensive because of considerable design, construction and testing requirements. It
could, however, be accomplished without schedule impact and would not substantially
impact other KSC resources.
The second alternative would entail minor site work at Pad A, including increasing the
height of the existing revetment wall and possibly providing a large ditch leading out to
the lagoon; at Pad B some of the existing ditches would have to be blocked off or rerouted
and a new ditch provided between the dump area and the lagoon. In both cases action
would be required to preclude personnel and equipment from entering areas with high GOX
concentrations, and a study shou Id be conducted at both Pads to detennine alternate routes
for the emergency vehicles parked at the sl ide wire bunker. Both Pad modifications would
have small cost impact and no impact on schedules or other resources.
The third alternative of extending drain piping would decrease the GOX hazard by moving
the dumping point further away from the facility. At Pad A this change would be more
effective than the first alternative, but more expensive because of the additional hard-
ware required. At Pad B, the general arrangement of drainage ditches and the close proximity
of the lagoon would require site work in addition to extending the piping.
leaving the installation unchanged is not recommended for Pad A because of the relatively
small cost of the second alternative. To- continue venting at Pad B with the existing installa-
tion is undesirable because the configuration of the drainage ditches promotes the flow of
the GOX cloud toward 'the slide wire bunker and back toward the storage area. In both
cases, continuation of present mode of operation would require action to preclude the entry
of personnel and equipment into the area during dumping operations, and to develop alter-
nate routes for the emergency vehicles parked at the rescue bunker. This solution would
have little cost and no schedule or-other resources impact.
RECOMMENDATlON
Technically, the most effective method of reducing the
hazardous condition at the facility drain area is the
installation of a catch tank/vent stack at a remote area;
however, this would involve considerable expense com-
pared to the other alternatives. It is recommended that
the second alternative be implemented in consideration
of the adequate results for minimum cost. The last
alternative would have the lowest cost, but acceptance
of greater risk would be required.
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D. Post Operations. After loading operations, the storage tank is depressurized.
The tank is vented through the steady-state vent, which is at an elevated position near
the tank equator. Alternative solutions to this problem, ranked in relation to the criteria,
are as follows:
1. Leave the existing vent stack as it is.
2. Increase the height of the existing vent stack.
3. Move the tank vent to a remote location.
4. Install equipment to reclaim vented gases.
If the existing vent stack is not modified and the system operation continues unchanged,
it would be advisable to implement strict controls to preclude the entry of personnel and
equipment into the area during storage tank depressurization. This alternative would
have a minimum cost, schedule, or other resou-rces impact.
The second alternative would allow more complete mixing of the cold, heavy GOX vapors
asthey fall toward the ground from the higher stack level; however, the hardware modifi-
cations would be relatively expensive. They could be accomplished without schedule
impact and would have little other resources impact. Moving the tank vent to a more
remote location as suggested by the third alternative would reduce the hazard in the storage
area; however, this would involve an ex'tensive hardware change and would be expensive.
In addition, the increased length of pipe would be very costly. Also, the increased length
of pipe would cause an increase in line pressure drop which could adversely affect the
tank blowdown rates and ullage space in the storage tank. This modification could be
accomplished without schedule impact and would have little other resources impact.
Installing equipment to reclaim the vented gases would require substantial design and
testing effort. Because this modification would be very expensive and could affect the
system operation, it is not recommended. It could, however, be accompl ished without
schedule impact. It would also create additional system maintenance.
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that the tank vent stack be left as is.
The exi sting stack has been used successfully in the
present mode of operation and, with strict c.ontrol of per-
sonnel and vehicles, it should provide safe operation
with no cost impact.
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3.1.1.2 LH2 System
o
A. System Charging. There are three sub-modes of system charging which
release gaseous hydrogen to the atmosphere, and the alternative solutions will be dis-
cussed in the following order: Venting at Top of Storage Tank, Purging of Gases after
Loading, and Venting Tankers after Loading .into and out of the storage tank.
Ventin.9.. at Top of Storage Tank: During storage tank loading, gaseous hydro-
gen is vented to the atmosphere at a height of 85 feet at a rate of approximately 240 scfm
(0.024 Ib/sec). The alternative solutions to this problem are ranked as follows:
1. Route gas to burn pond and burn.
2. Conti nue to vent gas to atmosphere at top of storage tank.
3. Route gas to burn pond and vent to atmosphere.
Routing the gas to the bum pond is undesirable because it increases the hazard area and
the area which must be controlled (approximately 700 feet to burn pond>' In the past this
has proven difficult. (It has been reported personnel have climbed over the fence surround-
ing the pond during an operati on.> Confining the gas in a pipe makes it easier to detonate,
but unconfined hydrogen requ ires a powerful ignition source (such as a blasting cap) to
detonate. The first and third alternatives are therefore not recommended.
The second alternative is preferred because it limits the hazard area and therefore the
control area. Detonation would be extremely unlikely to occur. At Lewis Research
C'enter tne allowable vent rate (in a congested area) is 0.25 Ib/sec. At Plum Brook
Station (an uncrowded area) the allowable vent rate is 0.5 Ib/sec.* The vent rate during
storage tank loading is 0.024 Ib/sec., 10 percent of that at Lewis.
RECOMMENDATION
As the existing hydrogen gas discharge rates meet the
requirements of NASA TMX-52454, with which KSC
concurs, it is recommended that venting in the present
manner be continued, and engineering for a suitable
static discharger be initiated (LC-34 and LC-37 have
workable designs).
*Lewis Research Center Liquid Hydrogen Safety Manual, NASA TMX-52454, governs
venting of hydrogen at Lewis and Plumb Brook installations.
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Purging of Gases After loading: After tankers have off loaded liquid hydrogen,
the hose between the tanker and the fill manifold is purged of hydrogen with gaseous
helium. This action causes venting of gaseous hydrogen from the tanker bleed valve at
the personnel level. The alternative solutions suggested for this problem are ranked as
follows:
1. Connect a flex hose from the bleed valve to the vent system on the fi II
manifold.
2. Connect bleed valve to vent above the personnel level.
3. Continue purging flex hose to the atmosphere.
The first alternative would require a modification to allow venting through the fill mani-
fold vent system. It would also require a procedure change to purge the line before con-
necting, and to provide sampling instructions. This operation is complicated and risky
because there is a possibility of air getting into the system. The second solution would
require a system modification including vent piping, purge system, sampling and pipe
supports. Gaseous hydrogen would still be vented to the atmosphere so that a sample may
be taken, but not as much hydrogen would be released.
The third solution is preferred because inerting the hose takes little time and personnel
can be kept clear of the venting area.
RECOMMENDATION
As the existing method takes but little time and discharge
rates meet requirements of NASA TMX-52454, it is
recommended that this method be continued and strict safety
procedures be used to clear personnel from the venting area.
Venting Tankers After Loading: After the tankers have off loaded liquid hydro-
gen they are presently vented to the onsite atmosphere to maintain tankers at standby
pressure. Each tanker vents at a rate of approximately 0.45 Ib/sec at a level 10 feet
above ground. Two to three tankers are normally vented at the same time, so that the
total flow rate could be 1.35 Ib/sec. The alternative solutions to the problem are
ranked as fol lows:
1. Vent tankers through fill manifold vent system to burn pond.
2. Vent tankers through storage tank vent.
3. Continue to vent tankers to the atmosphere.
4. Provide a separate vent system for tankers.
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In the first alternative I the high vent rates and the height-above-ground factor indicate
that it would be preferable to vent through the fill manifold system I but the problem of
personnel control in the larger hazardous area and the one-minute vent time reduce the
advantage. Also I all tankers would have to be empty before venting and relief pressure
may be exceeded during the waiting period I causing tanks to vent to the atmosphere.
Using alternative two appears desirable because GH 2 vented through the storage tank
vent would be at a safe elevation for adequate dispersion. The tankers would be vented
down to a pressure of 10 psig. Venting could be accomplished through liquid in the
tank; or I with a pneumatics change to enable local control of valve A3304 I the tankers
could be vented through the ullage space in the tank. Venting through the ullage space
would be preferable to prevent upsetting thermal balance in the tank.
In the third alternative it is difficult to determine the hazard level of venting tankers to
the atmosphere because the vent rate is larger than at Lewi s or Plum Brook I but the
duration is shorter. Also I the tankers will build up pressure during warmup and may
activate a relief valve. Venting of the tankers to the atmosphere has been the standard
mode of operation at Pads 34 I 37 I and 39 I and by ensuring adequate grounding and
lightning protection I has resulted in no incidents.
The last alternative would require an extensive modification for adding the separate
tanker vent system including overhead vent lines I purge and sampling systems I plus
additional setup and maintenance time.
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that tankers be vented through the
storage tank vent.
B. Standby. During normal standby conditions the storage tank vents GH2 gas
to the atmosphere at a rate of approximately 0.00136 Ib/sec at an elevation of 85 feet.
The stack on top of the tank occasionally ignites because the existing design is inadequate.
This fire is easily extinguished by increasing the purge rate and closing the storage tank
vent valve to allow the vent stack to cool below the hydrogen ignition temperature. The
suggested alternatives to this problem are ranked as follows:
1. Continue the operation in the same manner.
2. Pipe gas to the burn pond and burn.
3. Increase the GN 2 purge rate.
Continuing the operation at a vent rate which is far less than that used at Lewis Research
Center or the Plum Brook Station is not considered hazardous. Occasional fires which
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may occur in this operation cou id be prevented by an adequate static discharger design.
The second alternative solution would extend the hazard area and personnel control area,
and the burn pond wou Id have to operate conti nuous Iy; therefore, it is not consi dered a
practical method. The third suggested solution would prevent fires by di luting the hydro-
gen with GN2' but the cost would be prohibitive.
RECOMMENDATION
As vent rates are within the requirements of TMX-52454,
it is recommended that the storage tank venti ng to the
atmosphere be continued.
C. System 0eeration. During S-II/S-!VB vehicle loading, a large quantity of
GH2 is burned in the burn pond located midway between the pad and the LH2 faci lity.
No alternative solutions or design changes are suggested because the method of disposing
of large quantities of gas with low back-pressure is considered acceptable.
3.1.1.3 Hypergols System
A. Modes. All hypergoi system modes of operation appear to have adequate flush
and drain capabi lities I but the existing vapor venting capabilities are worthy of considera-
tion. The alternative solutions for this problem may be ranked for all operational modes
as follows:
1. Continue venting to the atmosphere.
2. Install di lution system (air or water>.
3. Install decomposition system.
A separate, detai led study of the hypergol vapor decomposition methods used by industry
is being conducted by DD-MDD-41 to determine if any would be feasible for use at KSC.
Several methods of decomposing hypergol vapor into harmless gas have been developed
by industry I but all are based on steady flow and continuous operation; therefore I these
methods are not directly applicable for the variable flow and intermittent operation at
KSC. The Design Engineering study to determine the optimum method for converting
LC-39 hypergol vapor to harmless gases is being conducted as follows:
1. Data on present industrial methods are being gathered.
2. Industrial methods are being analyzed for adaptability to variable flow
and discontinuous operations.
3. Industrial methods will be rated according to adaptability to KSC con-
ditlons.
4. Cost/time impacts for each method will be developed.
3 and 4.
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5. Optimum method will be defined by analysis of data develop'ed in steps
RECOMMENDATION
Although the present methods of venting are considered acceptable,
it is recommended that the detai led design study now being conducted
be completed to determine the optimum method of hypergol decom-
position and the resulting findings and recommendations communicated
through normal KSC channels, i.e., reports, change board process, etc.
B. Hypergol Training Faci lity. Hypergol vapor clouds produced for training fire-
men, rescue specialists and technicians are currently included in a separate DE detailed
assessment of pollution at KSC and corrective measures for compliance with Presidential
Order 11507 (Reduction of Pollution).
The Hypergol Training Faci lity appears to have adequate flush and drain, and vapor
venting capabilities, but all system functional designs are considered to be suitable for
investigation. Alternative solutions would be considered appropriate only after a detailed
design analysis.
A separate, detailed design analysis of the facility is now being conducted by DD-MDD-41
to correct operating anomalies. Considerable improvement in operation and some improve-
ment in safety is expected to result, but this wi II not reduce (nor increase) production of
vapor clouds, which is a required operational capabi lity controlled by IS-PEM operating
procedures.
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that the detailed design analysis now
being conducted be carried to completion and optimizing
recommendations implemented through the normal KSC
change board process.
3.1.1.4 RP-1 System. No RP-l liquid or vapor hazards were identified for normal
system operations, and no design changes are recommended.
3.1.1.5 GN2 System. During normal operations the high pressure GN2 system vents
GN2 by the operation of relief valves, vents, etc. As all the vents are piped to dis-
charge in a manner which presents no hazard to personnel or equipment; therefore no
design changes are' recommended.
3.1.1.6 ECS Operations. Hazardous ECS operations start when purge GN2 shutoff
valves and manual inlet valves are opened to configure GN2 standby. This occurs prior
to air-to-GN2 changeover, which is initiated 80 to 30 minutes before cryogenic loading
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preparations and during the T-9 hold. Thi s hazardous operation continue~ untU ~iftoff
and is terminated by closing the purge GN2 hand valves when pad access IS obtained.
For COOT, hazardous ECS operation is terminated by GN2 to air changeover 30 minutes
after cryogenic drain by closing the purge GN2 handvalves.
The existing procedures and safety equipment are considered adequate to prevent hazards
to personnel from a GN2 rich atmosphere. These safeguards include oxygen monitoring,
safety clearance, provision of Scott air packs, and venting relief valves to areas outside
of the ECS room.
RECOMMENDATION
. . ...
No changes are recommended. The safety oxygen monitor-
ing procedural requirements for pad rooms adjacent to the
ECS room are adequate for periods following hazardous
ECS operations.
3.1.1.7 GH2 System. For all normal operations or emergencies, GH2 is vented to
the abnosphere. The system is designed so that all vent valves and relief valves vent
to a 40-foot high flare stack which burns the GH2 safely. As this is not considered a
problem area, no design changes are recommended.
3.1.1.8 Helium S~stem. All normal operations of the helium system vent gaseous
helium to the atmosp ere, but this is not considered a problem because vent and relief
valves are all piped to vent in a manner which presents no hazard to personnel or equip-
ment. No design changes are recommended.
3.1.2 CONVERTER COMPRESSOR FACILITY
3.1.2.1 LN2 System
A. System Charging. During filling of the storage tank LN2 boiloff of GN2 is
vented from the tank, and after unloading, LN2 tankers are vented to the atmosphere.
Venting from the storage tank is approximately 30 feet above the ground level and con-
sidered adequate to prevent displacement of oxygen at the personnel level. Venting
from the tankers can be limited procedurally if necessary.
RECOMMENDATION
No design changes are recommended, however, measure-
ments should be taken during a worst-case typical LN2
tanker vent operation to verify that there is no significant
reduction in the oxygen content of the air.
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B. Standby. During standby periods LN2 storage tank boiloff vents GN2 to the
atmosphere 30 feet above ground at a rate of about 65 scfm. Venting at this level is
considered adequate to prevent displacement of oxygen at the personnel level.
RECOMMENDATION
No design changes are recommended.
C. System Operation. During normal operations there are three sub-modes of
operation which release GN2 to the atmosphere. The low pressure N2 vaporizer auto-
matically vents outside the building about 10 feet above ground during the standby mode
(backup for Big Three) to prevent' excess pressure buildup; system relief valves and/or
vent/drain valves may vent as part of normal system operation; and Big Three relief valves
and/or vent valves may vent during normal operation. None of these operational sub-
modes is considered a problem, but some measurements should be taken below the L.P.
vaporizer vent to verify that the oxygen content of the air is adequate.
RECOMMENDATION
No design changes are recommended; however, the air
below the L. P. vaporizer should be checked during
venting to determine if there is any significant reduc-
tion in oxygen content. Tests should be conducted
during the worst period of ambient contamination.
3.1.3 VEHICLE ASSEMBLY BUI LDING
3.1.3.1 Pneumatics System. All operational modes of the pneumatics system vent
GN2 and GHe in confined areas. Failure of several vent or relief valves would result
in large quantiti es of these gases bei ng released into nonventi lated areas and conse-
quently lower the oxygen content of the air below allowable minimums (see "VAB Gas
Venting Hazard Survey," Bendix Launch Support Division, July 1967). The alterna-
tive solutions to this problem are ranked as follows:
1. Route all vents to the outside of the building.
2. Route vents to bay areas in VAB where dilution would prevent oxygen
concentration from becoming too low.
3 • Conti nue operati on in the present manner.
3-13
RECOMMENDATION
Further investigation of the above alternatives is requi red
in order to determine a proper course of action. Design
Engineering and the Safety Office wi II look into thi:s prob-
lem further and any design changes resulting from subse-
quent recommendations will be processed through normal
KSC channels.
3.1.4 PROPELLANT SYSTEMS CLEANING LABORATORY. This facility is used
for cleaning, checkout, calibration, and testing of various components. No problems
have been identified with any of the systems involved.
3.2 SPACECRAFT AND INDUSTRIAL AREA
3.2.1 OPERATIONS AND CHECKOUT BUILDING. Gases vented by all operating
modes of all gas systems are piped outsidethe Operations and Checkout Building and no
problems have been identified.
3.2.2 ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS TEST FACILITY. The 10,000 psi G02
System is the only source of any appreciable gas release at this facility. High pressure
G02 is vented from relief valves and vent valves, but no problems were identified in any
mode of operation.
3.3 UNMANNED LAUNCH OPERATIONS
3.3.1 COMPLEX 17
3.3.1.1 Liquid Oxygen System. The problem areas identified at LC-17 were in two
sub-modes of system operation: Detanking <Dumping, Venting) and Vehicle Venting.
No problems were apparent in the charging, standby, or post operational modes.
A. Detanking <Dumping, Venting). The dump line is located at the east edge of
the launch deck, dumping into the flume. If an emergency dump is necessary, it is possi-
ble that the rooms underneath the launch deck wi II be fi lied with GOX. The electrical
equipment in the room is not hazard proof. The emergency dump probabi lity is estimated
at 5 percent per detanking attempt. The alternative solutions for this contingency are
ranked as follows:
1. Relocate and extend the dump line.
2. Seal and pressurize the rooms under the launch deck.
3. Hazard proof all electrical equipment.
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RECOMMENDATION
A detailed study of the first and second alternative
solutions is now being conducted and should be com-
pleted in about 30 days. Hazard proofing the elec-
trical equipment may require replacing the equipment
and would be expensive. Upon completion of the
detai led study I any recommended hardware or procedural
changes will be processed through the normal KSC change
board process.
B. Vehicle Venting. The L02 cold flow is performed with the service structure
around the vehicle. The venting of the vehicle L02 tank during this operation could fill
some of the service structure rooms with GOX. The alternative solutions to this problem
are ranked as follows:
1. Inspect the rooms to ensure that any electrical equipment that is not
hazard proof is turned off. Inspect all rooms after the operation to ensure that the atmo-
sphere is not oxygen-rich before returning to normal operations.
2. Remove the service structure during this test.
3 • Seal and pressurize the rooms.
RECOMMEN DATI ON
The first solution is recommended because the rooms
could easi Iy be inspected with electrical power off I
and they could be venti lated to reduce oxygen concen-
trations if necessary. Pressuriz ing the rooms is not
considered economically feasible I and removing the
service structure is a lengthy I hazardous task that
would require additional support expense.
3.3.2 COMPLEX 36
3.3.2.1 Liquid Oxygen System
A. System Charging and Operating. During the venting sub-modes of these opera-
tions I LOX storage tanks are vented through a vent at the tanks I creating' a GOX cloud
in the storage tank area (in a controlled condition during this period). The alternative
solutions for this problem are ranked as follows:
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1. Continue present method of venting.
2. Extend vent lines out of the storage area.
NOTE
There are no standby or post operations problems at
Complexes 36A and 36B.
RECOMMENDATlON
A detailed study of the second alternative solution is now
being conducted and should be completed in about 30 days.
If a change is recommended I it will be initiated through the
normal KSC channels.
B. System Operation. During the Iiquid oxygen cold flow test, performed with
the service structure in place I venting from the top of the umbilical tower could fill some
of the service structure rooms with GOX. The alternative solutions to this problem are
ranked as follows:
1. Turn off service structure power after test and inspect rooms before
opening the structure for normal work.
2. Remove the service structure during this test.
RECOMMENDATION
Because removal of the service structure is a lengthy
task requiring added support expense I the first alterna-
tive is recommended. Service structure power can be
secured without affecting the test I the rooms. can be
inspected for oxygen enrichment of the atmosphere I
and venti lation can be readi Iy performed if required.
3.3.2.2 LH2 System. The only problem identified in this system is venting of LH 2
during storage tank filling and vehicle tanking.
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RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that the present venting procedure be
continued because storage tank hydrogen is vented to a
burn stack located 50 feet above the umbilical mast.
During tank fi lling, the tankers are separately vented to
a line 100 feet from the storage tank.
3.3.3 WESTERN TEST RANGE
3.3.3.1 ~Uid Ox~gen System. The only problem identified at the Western Test
Range occursuring t e normal lOX tanking and leak check operation, which is per-
fonned with the service structure in place. Vented GOX could fi II some of the service
structure rooms during this operation. The alternative solutions to this problem are
as follows: .
1. Turn off service structure power and inspect area after test and before
opening the structure for normal work.
2. Hazard proof the service structure rooms either by positive purges,
ventilation, de-energizing unused circuits and/or hazard proofing electrical equipment.
RECOMMENDATION
The complex wi II undergo major modifications after the
next launch, and it is recommended that the second
alternative be implemented then.
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SECTION IV
CONC LUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
4.1 SYSTEMS SUMMARY
The results of this study are summarized below by area and system. Conclusions and
recommendations are presented on a system by system basis with a distinction between
recommendations concerning existing faci Iities and alternatives which should be con-
sidered for new faci Iities.
4.1.1 LOX. The best technical solution to dumping relatively large amounts of LOX
is to discharge the LOX into a pressure vessel which would separate liquid and gas and
vent the gas at a sufficiently high elevation to provide adequate dilution under all atmo·
spheric conditions.
An alternate method involving the acceptance of greater risk with respect to the size and
location of vapor clouds is to discharge the LOX into an open top tank, basin, ditch, or
directly onto the ground. The degree of risk varies with how remote the location of the
discharge Is with respect to personnel and equipment, and the probability that the vapor
cloud wi II be moved to a more hazardous location by wind, normal dispersion, or the
geometry of the containment area. This risk can be minimized by consideration of these
factors.
-. _. ---_._.__ .
4.1.2 LH2. The best solution for disposing of large quantities of hydrogen is to vaporize
the liquid and burn the resulting gas. In cases such as steady state venting of the LH2
storage vessel or other small flow rates of hydrogen gas, the risk of venting raw hydrogen is
acceptable (TMX-52454).
4.1.3 RP-l. There appear to be no problems associated with handling and disposing
of RP-l, provided that proper safety procedures are uti Iized. Environmental pollution
should be considered however, in disposing of RP-l.
4.1.4 LN2. It is felt that LN2 may be safely dumped in remote open areas where
there is little chance of depleting oxygen content. In all cases however, safety pro-
cedures should be followed to monitor oxygen content and to prevent personnel from
InadvertentIy entering the discharge area. ThermaI environmenta I po lIution shou Id be
.considered, however.
If small quantities of LN2 are discharged into inhabited areas such as at the LN2 tank
fill manifold during storage tank fi lIing" safety procedures to include oxygen content
monitoring should be enforced. .'
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4.],.5 HYPfE~GOlS. P!'esen~methods of venting hypergols to the atmosphere at KSC
are considered an acceptaMe risk due to rigid safety procedures. A better alternative,
however u w@uid be eli lutioi"'ll Cil~ the hypergois to a nonhazardous level with air, H20, or by
some tlltheC' me~hod. This, 11owe~er, again adds to environmental pollution.
Methods of disposing of ai! vented quantities of hypergols to include vapor decomposition
are being further studied in datal I. The results of this study will be communicated through
nOmla~ KSC cl'i~G'Bl'ie~s.
4.1.6 GOJC GOX should be vented at relatively high locations with respect to
~ersonnei arid equipment. ~f there is a reasonable possibi lity of the occurrence of high
concentratiofils of GO}{ Ii"! closed areas containing electrical equipment, hazard proof
equ~~ment should be lJ$ed or power turned off at such times. 1\
4.1. 7 GH2. Re~ZlUvely large quantities of GH2 should be vented into a flare stack
and burned. Small quantities may be vented through high vent stacks without burning.
4.1.8 GN2. large quantities of GN2 should be vented at high elevations to allow
for adequate dispewsion. Closed areas in which there is a risk of GN2 should have an
~x.~~~n mOB1otofBng system which will warn personnel entering of low aygen content.
4. J.l.. 9 GHe. large quantities of GHe should be vented at high elevations to allow
fc~ adequate dlspershm. Closed areas in which there is a risk of GHe should have
oxygen monitoring system which will warn personnel entering of low oxygen content.
4.1.10 ECS. The operating mode of the ECS system is the only hazardous condition
in this system. Since GN2 is used in this mode, the recommendations are the same as
foG' venting of large quantities of GN2.
4.2 OTHER'RECOMMENDATIONS
4.2.1 LOX STUDiES, LC-17 AND LC-36. Unmanned Launch Operations is
pr~$entlymaking a detai led study of LOX systems in LC-17 and lC-36 areas. The
results of thes~ studies will be communicated through normal KSC channels.
4.2.2 OTHER POTENTIAL HAZARDS. It is recommended that the Safety Office look
1i1~@ the ~@Uowlng areas which were not included in the scope of this study:
ale HazaU'ds e~Ci\ted by volatile fluids used in such locations as cleaning facilities
or photo labs.
b. Halzawods created by venting of space vehicle tanks during checkout in the VAB.
~t Is ~iso recommei1dGd that Installation Support review potential radiation hazards which
also were not covered by this study.
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